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Abstract
To clarify what is involved in linking models to instruments, we adapt
quantum mechanics to define models that display explicitly the points at which
they can be linked to statistics of results of the use of instruments. Extending
an earlier proof that linking models to instruments takes guesswork, we show:
Any model of cryptographic instruments can be enveloped, nonuniquely, by
another model that expresses conditions of instruments that must be met if
the first model is to fit a set of measured outcomes. As a result, model α of
key distribution can be enveloped in various ways to reveal alternative models
that Eve can try to implement, in conflict with model α and its promise of
security. A different enveloping model can help Alice and Bob by expressing
necessities of synchronization that they manipulate to improve their detection
of eavesdropping. Finally we show that models based on pre-quantum physics
are also open to envelopment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A designer Diana and the users Alice and Bob of cryptographic transmitting and receiving
instruments, as well as the eavesdropper Eve, all employ various equations to model how
results of the use of these instruments depend on what the participants do. Between a
model as a set of equations and instruments made of glass and silicon there is a great
divide. In choosing a model to analyze instruments or to be employed in a feedback loop
where the model helps to operate instruments, one makes a link across this divide. While
one can interpret measured results as refuting some candidate models, we recently proved
that neither they nor logic can uniquely determine a quantum model: linking a model to
instruments requires something beyond logic and measured data, something well named by
the word guess [1].
Proofs of the security of quantum key distribution invoke inner products of quantum
state vectors, and these depend on the model chosen. Here we prove that any given set of
outcomes from a transmitter and receiver used to distribute a key can be fitted by many
quantum-mechanical models which differ greatly among themselves in their inner products
and hence in their implications for the security of a key. On one hand, this encourages
Eve to invent snooping instruments even though she knows Alice and Bob have a proof of
security, and, on the other hand, our findings encourage discovery and repair of “hidden
security loopholes” [2] arising because their transmitting and receiving instruments “violate
... assumptions [that underlie their model] in ways not immediately apparent to Alice and
Bob” [3].
To underpin an examination of the linking of models to instruments, in Section II we
adapt quantum mechanics to define models that display explicitly the points at which they
can be linked to statistics of results of the use of instruments. The models to be intro-
duced express “what the participants do” in terms of commands sent to the instruments
via Classical, digital Process-control Computers (CPC’s) that control them and that also
record results from them; we call these CPC-oriented models. Section III extends an earlier
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proof that linking CPC-oriented models to instruments takes guesswork: For any quantum-
mechanical model of transmitting and receiving instruments there is another model (not
unique) that expresses constraints in using the instruments that must be met if the first
model is to fit a set of measured outcomes. We say the first model is enveloped by the
second.
In Section IV we prove that for any quantum model α of key distribution, there exists
an enveloping model β that matches α with respect to measurements contemplated in α
but that has smaller inner products and allows for other measurements, which, if Eve can
implement them, allow undetected eavesdropping, in conflict with model α and its promise
of security. For this reason, no proof can relieve Alice and Bob of the burden of making
judgments about what models to link to their instruments, something implicit in [2,3], but
here made vivid.
They can, however, put the same burden of judgment on Eve, for she too must use
models. In Section V model α is enveloped by another model that expresses necessities of
synchronization that Alice and Bob can manipulate to improve their detection of eavesdrop-
ping. In Section VI we indicate how models based on pre-quantum physics are also open to
envelopment.
In summary, we find that instruments modeled are used in a context of circumstances
and intentions which no model can fully describe. In creating an enveloping model, one
formally expresses (rightly or wrongly) some hitherto unexpressed feature of this context.
As will be proved, there is no end of opportunities to assert features of context, because any
enveloping model can in turn be enveloped.
II. LINKING INSTRUMENTS TO MODELS
The central issue is the linking of uses of instruments to models. By model we mean a
set of equations written in mathematical language, primarily quantum mechanics, with the
intent of predicting statistics of the results of using instruments (such as transmitters and
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receivers made of silicon and glass fibers etc.). Some of the equations of the set act as a set
of assumptions from which the rest of the equations can be derived. Quantum mechanics
provides a mathematical language in which to write down a wide variety of models, con-
strained by a grammar of logical constraints, so within a model conclusions can be proved to
follow from assumptions. Because different sets of assumptions generate different quantum-
mechanical models, quantum mechanics is a language, as distinct from a particular model
written in that language; it has more room in it for diverse models that accord with any
given set of experimental results than has been appreciated.
Although, as we shall see, instruments cannot be discussed independently of models, we
separate them as best we can by the trick supposing the instruments are operated via digital
computers. This will allow us to express “how the instruments are used” in terms of com-
mands sent to the instruments by a Classical, digital Process-control Computer (CPC) that
controls them and that also records results from them [1]. Instruments swallow commands
and give back recordable results.
As discussed in [1], parsing a stream of data from instruments into a sequence of measure-
ment occurrences, each with a quantum-mechanical outcome, cannot be determined from the
data alone, but takes extra hypotheses, indeed a kind of stripped-down model, determined in
part by guesswork, which we call a parsing rule. Parsing requires guesswork, both to assert
the statistical independence of one segment of data from another, and to select criteria by
which to weed out artifacts in the data attributed to instrumental imperfections, such as
false and missed detections. Using a parsing rule, one parses a stream of data from the
instruments into a sequence of measurement occurrences, assumed statistically independent,
and one formats the data segment for each occurrence into (1) how the instruments were
configured and (2) an outcome from the instruments. The parsing rule makes no statement
about values of probabilities of outcomes, but does assert that such values exist; it provides
a range of outcomes that are possible to record as well as set of possible command sequences.
In this way it limits the models that can be tested by measured data that it parses.
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To view the linking of instruments to models we postulate an analytic frame in which (a)
instruments write via some parsing rule what we and other scientists interpret as numerical
outcomes, (b) they write these numbers in memories of CPC’s, and (c) CPC’s send commands
to some or all of the instruments. We view each set-up of instruments in terms of records
in CPC memories of commands sent to the instruments by CPC’s and of outcomes from
the instruments. Notice that we make no assumption that an instrument works as the
manufacturer says it does, nor that it works the way any model compatible with the parsing
rule says it does, nor that it functions statistically the same on Tuesday as it does on Monday.
While such assumptions are made in the models to be discussed, the analytic frame provides
room to consider cases in which the instruments write numbers that conflict with any or all
models.
We define a CPC-oriented model of a set-up of instruments to be a model that expresses
conditional probabilities of outcomes given commands to the instruments. For instance, a
model α to be introduced in Section IV will express a conditional probability of outcome j
given a command bA from Alice’s CPC to her transmitter and a command bE from Eve’s CPC
to her eavesdropping receiver, written Prα(j|bA, bE). The subscript marks it as an assertion
within model α, leaving room to consider a different model β that asserts a different numerical
value Prβ(j|bA, bE) 6= Prα(j|bA, bE).
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The same CPC’s that control the instruments house in their memories CPC-oriented
models and programs designed using them. These models and model-derived programs
are used off-line to simulate the instruments; they are used on-line, not to simulate the
instruments, but to help operate them, for example in a feedback loop of Bob’s receiver,
as discussed in Section V. By considering both the instruments and the models as they are
reflected in files of a CPC, we conceptually separate (as well as possible) these CPC-oriented
1This extends our earlier analysis of instruments controlled by a single CPC programmed according
to some model [1,4] to deal with a setup of instruments controlled by several CPC’s.
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models from the instruments modeled while allowing for interaction between models and
instruments.
Like any set of equations, a CPC-oriented model can be copied, so copies of the same
model can be used concurrently in different places for the same or different purposes. What
can be done with a model or a program depends on where it is, for example on whether it is
written in Alice’s CPC or in Eve’s. Because the models used in programming one CPC need
not be the same as those used in programming another, several CPC’s controlling interacting
instruments can work from different models concurrently. Where and when and how a CPC-
oriented model is used is traceable in the execution sequences of the CPC’s in which copies of
the model are housed, so the CPC frame allows analysis of various of CPC-oriented models
and model-derived programs used to operate instruments that interact. Some or all of the
instruments can be modeled by more than one model, and one model can conflict with
another. Some models model other models: a component of Eve’s model can be her model
α′ of Alice and Bob’s model α; this tells her (rightly or wrongly) how Alice and Bob, using
their model α, will decide on their security, distinct from how Eve decides using her model
β. Conversely, Alice and Bob’s model α contains as a component a model β ′, their model of
Eve’s model β. There is no necessary stopping place in modeling models.
If a model α invokes all the assumptions of a model β and possibly more, we say model α
specializesmodel β, or that model β generalizesmodel α (meaning it has fewer assumptions).
This is the first of several types of relations among models that will be used to express inter-
actions between the invention and the modeling of transmitting and receiving instruments
used in cryptographic key distribution.
III. MODELS OF COMMUNICATION
Ignoring eavesdropping for the moment, we focus on Alice communicating to Bob, as
described quantum mechanically. Consider Alice transmitting m quantum bits of raw data
to Bob, with Alice using one CPC to control her transmitter and Bob using another to
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control his receiver. They want to jointly implement a CPC-oriented model γ of quantum
communication, which says at each of a sequence of m occurrences, Alice causes her CPC to
command the preparation of a state vector, choosing u for 0 or v for 1 at random. Her CPC
records her choices of 0 or 1. Bob’s receiver has, say, light detectors, one interpreted in model
γ as detecting u to indicate Alice’s choice of 0 and another detecting v to indicate Alice’s
transmission of 1. Bob’s CPC records the decisions of his receiver, described as deciding on
0 or 1 or, if neither detector fires, ‘inconclusive’ [5,6].
Model γ is composed of:
1. a set Aγ of command strings that Alice’s CPC can send to generate states, here just
the set {0, 1}; a set Bγ of commands that Bob’s CPC can send to his receiver, which
in this case is empty;
2. a Hilbert space Hγ = C
2 (i.e., the vector space of complex dimension 2);
3. a function for states as functions of commands (here only Alice’s commands), |vγ〉 :
Aγ →Hγ such that |vγ(0)〉 = u and |vγ(1)〉 = v;
4. a set of possible outcomes of Bob’s measurement, indexed by j ranging over natural
numbers or some subset of natural numbers, here 0 for |vγ(0)〉, 1 for |vγ(1)〉, and 2 for
‘inconclusive’;
5. a function from Bob’s commands to positive operator valued measures (POVM’s) on
Hγ, here simplified to the single POVM Mγ consisting of a set of detection operators
Mγ(j) with
∑
j Mγ(j) = 1,
(∀j)Mγ(j) ≥ 0 and Mγ(j) = Mγ(j)
†.
Model γ asserts the probability of outcome j given a command bA ∈ Aγ for state preparation
to be
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Prα(j|bA) = 〈vα(bA)|Mγ(j)|v(bA)〉. (1)
In relating model γ to results in his CPC, Bob thinks of his CPC as recording detection
results of Alice’s m-bit transmission in a sequence of m memory segments, each of which can
hold two bits, coded 00 for Alice’s ‘0’, 01 for Alice’s ‘1’, and 10 for ‘inconclusive’. We will
refer to these two-bit memory segments in connection with timing, to which we now turn.
A. Need for synchronization
Model γ is an armchair view of Bob’s receiver that lacks the detail necessary to design it.
To design a receiver that works according to model γ, Diana must provide for synchronizing
it to Alice’s transmitter within some allowed leeway. For this Diana envelops model γ
with a more detailed model δ that expresses the conditions of synchronization that must
be maintained between Alice’s transmitter and Bob’s receiver if model γ is to accord the
records of Alice’s commands and Bob’s detections. Diana provides for Bob’s receiver to
meet these conditions by adjusting the rate of Bob’s clock in response to measured results
interpreted in model δ. She designs this feedback loop by choosing a classical-control model
ǫ, to be discussed shortly. Without the gaps in synchronization defined by model δ and their
containment within the allowed leeway in accord with model ǫ, Bob’s CPC, driven by its
clock, would mistime its routing of a detector signal to the k-th memory segment, resulting
in an erroneous record.2
To express the effect on reception of the drift of the clock of Bob’s CPC relative to Alice’s
clock, Diana (having learned from Einstein) defines synchrony in terms of measurements
2Although for a short transmission line of a fixed delay, Bob and Alice can use the same clock to
drive their CPC’s synchronously, but for variable delay, e.g. if Bob is in motion, he needs his own
clock, independently adjustable [7]. And even where the single-clock design works, Bob’s receiver
must adjust its phase.
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made of Alice’s signal arriving at Bob’s clock; however, in using a quantum model of the
measurement of that signal, she must cope with quantum indeterminacy, which limits Bob’s
receiver’s knowledge of arrival times to what it can deduce via Bayes rule from outcomes.
To produce suitable outcomes, Diana invents a model δ, which has a Hilbert space Hδ, of
dimension higher than that of Hγ , along with states |vδ(bA, s)〉 that are functions not only
of Alice’s commands in Aδ = Aγ , but also of a skew s of Bob’s clock relative to an imagined
ideally synchronized clock. Diana designs Bob’s receiver to measure the k-th signal from
Alice when the clock of Bob’s CPC reads tk. When we imagine Bob’s clock reads tk as the
ideal clock reads tk − sk, we say Bob’s clock is fast by a skew sk. The state measured by
Bob’s receiver when his clock reads tk is then |vδ(bA, sk)〉 = Uδ(−sk)|vδ(bA, 0)〉, where Uδ is
a unitary-operator-valued function of sk by which Diana expresses skew.
In order to allow different possible outcomes for different values of the skew sk at the
reception of the k-th of the m signals from Alice, model δ must assume more possible
outcomes than the 0, 1, and ‘inconclusive’ of model γ, so the POVM Mδ has more than the
three detection operators of Mγ. When restricted to skews sk of magnitude smaller than
some allowed bound s0, model δ projects onto model γ as follows:
1. |vδ(b, sk)〉 7→ |vγ(b)〉, and
2. the detection operators of Mδ partition into three sets, such that the sum of operators
for each set maps to a single detection operator Mγ(j) with respect to probabilities of
detection of j.
But outcomes in model δ tell more than these projections. At each signal reception, Bob’s
receiver records in his CPC not only a decision among 0, 1, and ‘inconclusive’ but also
finer distinction from which his CPC estimates its clock skew (via Bayes rule and a prior
probability distribution that Diana assumes for skew). In order to record the outcomes that
help estimate skew and guide clock-rate adjustment, Bob’s receiver, designed using model
δ, needs a memory segment for the k-th reception of more than two bits. Hence, the record
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previously discussed in connection with model γ is extracted from a larger record required
by model δ.3
To contain skews within the tolerable bound s0, Diana chooses a classical model ǫ by
which to design a program that, when executed by Bob’s CPC, responds to estimated skews
by sending a command from the CPC to set a ‘faster-slower’ lever on the clock that drives
that CPC; the command is a value of a control function Fǫ that takes as its argument a
computer file consisting of skews calculated from recently recorded detection results and
recently issued commands to the clock itself. Although the quantum state to be controlled
has a history that Bob’s CPC can only estimate via Bayes rule from outcomes, the design
of a control function Fǫ is within the discipline of classical feedback design.
4 If model δ is
implemented and if model ǫ succeeds in generating steering commands that are adequate,
the skews are held within the bound ±s0 so that Bob’s detection results fulfill the intention
of model γ and, additionally, allow his CPC to make skew estimates necessary to guide clock
adjustment.
Remark 1: Models, such as γ and δ, express desires and obstacles more flexibly than do
inputs used for this purpose in control theory [8,9]. Alice expresses what she wants by
choosing model γ altogether, not just by an ‘input’ of 0 or 1 to her transmitter. Because
Diana wants Alice and Bob’s instruments to work in accord with Alice’s model γ, in spite
of the obstacle of clock drift, she chooses models δ and its classical companion, model ǫ.
Remark 2: The number of bits that arrive at Bob’s receiver is model-dependent: whether
a detection result for a signal is seen as two bits (ignoring skew) or as more bits (allowing
3Must there exist a quantum mechanical model that accords with experimental results of measure-
ments of a skew-dependent state? Yes, because, any digital record can be interpreted (nonuniquely)
as a record of quantum outcomes, and for any set of outcomes with their relative frequencies as
functions of commands, many quantum mechanical models have probabilities that exactly fit [1].
4For discussion of Bayes rule in a non-quantum context of control, see [8].
for skew) depends on whether the record of the signal detection is interpreted using model
γ or model δ.
Recall the freedom always present in quantum mechanical modeling to shift the boundary
between the ‘system’ modeled and the measuring instrument, for instance by counting more
of the measuring instrument as part of the system [10]. In view of this freedom, we conclude:
Remark 3: Every quantum mechanical model is contingent in the sense that it is projected
onto by a restriction of an enveloping model that shows other possibilities.
IV. MODELS OF VULNERABILITY TO EAVESDROPPING
Widely discussed quantum-mechanical models of key distribution assert a nonzero inner
product between quantum state vectors that Alice communicates to Bob, with the conse-
quence that eavesdropping almost always leaves tracks in the form of errors that Bob and
Alice can detect. If Alice’s transmitter, Bob’s receiver, and Eve’s snooping instruments can
be counted on to work in accord with any of these models, then Alice can send Bob a key se-
cure against undetected eavesdropping. The models can all be translated into CPC-oriented
models to make visible the points at which they can be linked to results of the use of instru-
ments, and it is to the credit of some of these models that relative frequencies of experimental
results accord reasonably well with conditional probabilities of outcomes derived from the
states and operators posited by the models. But we are sloppy if we forget that quantum
states are terms in models, rather than model-independent features of instruments.
In linking a CPC-oriented model α to instruments, one identifies commands in model α
with commands sent from CPC’s to the instruments, for example commands bA, bB, and bE
from CPC’s controlled by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively; one also parses results of the
use of instruments in response to commands as quantum-mechanical outcomes, so that one
can compare relative frequencies of these results to the conditional probabilities asserted by
model α, e.g. Prα(j|bA, bB, bE) as the conditional probability of a quantum outcome j given
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commands bA, bB, and bE . (The outcome j can be seen as several fragments, for example
one for Bob and one for Eve, allowing for analysis of mutual information between Eve and
Bob, etc.) It is to be noticed that this procedure sets up a divide that runs through the CPC
between state vectors as terms in models, on one side, and on the other side the commands
to and results from instruments. A large part of the story told here amounts to noticing this
divide.
Given a CPC-oriented model α of quantum key distribution that shows Alice and Bob
to be secure against eavesdropping, one can envelop model α in a model β that introduces
a range of conditions; under some conditions model β projects to model α, agreeing with it,
while under other conditions model β leads to drastically different conclusions in conflict with
those of model α. Among these are conditions under which Eve can learn the key without
leaving tracks that Alice and Bob can detect. This envelopment is possible because model
β can invoke states and their inner products that differ from those of model α while still
agreeing with model α with respect to probabilities of outcomes for commands considered
in model α.
For example, we envelop model α with a model β expressing conditions in which Alice’s
transmitter leaks light into a channel accessible to Eve, but that is unknown to Alice and
Bob (and is not expressed in model α [3]). There are two cases to consider, corresponding
to two types of models. Deferring models of Eve’s use of a probe, we start with the simpler
case of a model that segments the transmission of signals from Alice to Bob into (1) Alice’s
transmission to Eve, followed by (2) Eve’s transmission to Bob. For such segmented trans-
mission, suppose model α assumes that (1) Alice chooses commands from a set Aα = {0, 1},
with command bA generating a state vector |vα(bA)〉 ∈ Hα, and (2) Eve commands her lis-
tening instruments with a command bE ∈ Eα to make a measurement expressed by a POVM
Mα(bE) which has a detection operator Mα(bE ; jE) acting on Hα, associated with outcome
jE . Model α implies that the conditional probability of Eve obtaining the outcome jE given
her command bE and Alice’s command bA is
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Prα(jE |bA, bE) = 〈vα(bA)|Mα(bE ; jE)|vα(bA)〉. (2)
Proposition 1 Given any such (segmented) model α with inner product 〈vα(0)|vα(1)〉 and
given any 0 ≤ r < 1, there is a model β that gives the same conditional probabilities of Eve’s
outcomes for all her commands belonging to Eα, so
(∀bA ∈ Aα, bE ∈ Eα)Prβ(jE |bA, bE) = Prα(jE |bA, bE) (3)
while
|〈vβ(0)|vβ(1)〉| = r|〈vα(0)|vα(1)〉|. (4)
Proof: Motivated by the idea that, unknown to Alice, her transmitter signal might generate
an additional “leakage” into an unintended spurious channel that Eve reads, we construct
the following enveloping model β which assumes:
1. the same set of commands for Alice, so Aβ = Aα,
2. a larger Hilbert space Hβ = Hleak ⊗ Hα in which Alice produces vectors |vβ(bA)〉 =
|wβ(bA)〉 ⊗ |vα(bA)〉, with |wβ(bA)〉 ∈ Hleak;
3. a larger set of commands for Eve, Eβ = Eα ⊔ Eextra (disjoint union);
4. a POVM-valued function of Eve’s commands to her measuring instruments, with de-
tection operators
Mβ(bE ; jE) =


1leak ⊗Mα(bE ; jE) for all bE ∈ Eα,
Eve’s choice of POVM to distinguish |vβ(0)〉
from |vβ(1)〉 if bE ∈ Eextra.
(5)
According to model β, if Eve chooses any measurement command of Eα, Eq. (2) holds. But
model β speaks not of the vectors |vα(bA)〉 but of other vectors having an inner product of
magnitude
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|〈vβ(0)|vβ(1)〉| = |〈w(0)|w(1)〉||〈vα(0)|vα(1)〉|. (6)
The unit vectors |w(0)〉 and |w(1)〉 can be specified at will, so that the factor r
def
=
|〈w(0)|w(1)〉| can be chosen to be as small as one pleases. ✷
If she can find and gain access to a channel carrying leakage states, Eve implements a
model β with a value of r < 1, in which case she uses an optimal POVM to distinguish
Alice’s 1’s and 0’s, with fewer ‘inconclusives’ than Alice and Bob think possible, and hence
with less impact on Bob’s error rate. If Eve can do this, she has more information about
the key for a given rate of Bob’s errors than Alice and Bob found possible when they bet on
model α, thus vitiating Alice and Bob’s attempt to distribute a key secure against undetected
eavesdropping.
Whether Eve can implement a measurement of leakage as called for in model β with
r < 1 is unanswerable by modeling; it is a question that requires work on “the other side of
the divide.” The point to be stressed is that the agreement between model α and a set of
measured results, no matter what results, is no logical guarantee against Eve implementing
model β with a value of r less than 1, or even a value of 0 which would give her the whole
key while causing no errors for Alice and Bob to detect.
A. Models involving a defense function
When noise in communications channels is recognized, privacy amplification is necessary
to distill a secure key [11]. Arguments for the security of quantum key distribution with noisy
channels, summarized and refined in Refs. [3,12,13,14], center on a defense function. The
existence of a defense function depends on a proof (within some model) of a relation between
Eve’s maximum Renyi information on whatever bits she directly or indirectly interrogates
and a positive contribution to Bob’s error rate in receiving bits.
Defense functions have been analyzed for models of Eve’s use of a probe [15] and without
restricting Alice’s transmission to a choice of only two state vectors. In such a model α,
Alice chooses one of several state vectors in one Hilbert space Hsig,α while Eve generates a
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fixed vector in a different Hilbert space Hprobe,α, and the tensor product of Alice’s choice
of state vector and Eve’s fixed probe vector evolves unitarily in an interaction, after which
Eve and Bob make measurements, Eve confined to the probe sector and Bob to the signal
sector. Like segmented models, probe models relate Eve’s information to Bob’s error rate
in such a way that Bob’s error rate depends on inner products ascribed to the state vectors
among which Alice chooses; in particular if the inner products for distinct signal vectors are
all zero, Eve can learn everything without causing any effect that Alice and Bob can detect.
The Appendix displays consequences of leakage of Alice’s transmission for models involv-
ing Eve’s use of a probe: just as for models that segment the transmission, the state vectors
used to model Alice’s transmission are model-dependent, and so are their inner products.
To see the consequence for defense functions, suppose that Alice and Bob use model α which
assumes that Alice chooses between state vectors |vα(0)〉 and |vα(1)〉 with inner product
having a magnitude Sα = |〈vα(1)|vα(0)〉|. Assuming model α, Alice and Bob determine a
defense function t(n, eT ), as discussed in [12]; in order to mark its dependence on model α
and especially its dependence on the inner product of Sα, we write this as tα(n, eT , Sα). For
any such model α and whatever the measured results with which it accords, we can show
a model β that agrees with model α insofar as these results are concerned, but disagrees
with it about predictions of the detectability of Eve’s eavesdropping, because in place of the
inner product(s) of model α, model β has inner product(s) smaller by our choice of r, for
any 0 ≤ r < 1.
Proposition 2 If a model α asserts that Alice and Bob can distill a key that is secure
against measurements commanded by Eve from a set of commands Eα, then there exists
another model β that matches the predictions of model α for the commands in Eα but that
makes additional commands available to Eve that make the key insecure.
To prove this, one uses Proposition 3 of the Appendix that envelops any model α with a
model β in which Sβ = rSα with r as small as one pleases. The effect of making Sβ smaller
than Sα is visible for the case of B92 models [5] in Figure 4 of [12], where Sβ is denoted (in
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notation with which our notation regrettably clashes) by sin 2α. One sees that as Sβ gets
smaller, tβ gets bigger, so that at any fixed error rate, one can determine an r for which
model β allows no distilled secure key. For the BB84 model as discussed in [12], the effect
of r ≪ 1 in an enveloping model β is to conflict with the BB84 model in such a way as to
increase t and allow undetected eavesdropping.
Thus, just as for segmented eavesdropping discussed above, Eve can try to implement
a model β which drastically increases what she can learn for a given error rate. Again,
whether she can succeed in implementing such a model is another question, on the other
side of the divide that runs through the CPC’s between models and instruments. No matter
what measured results they stand on, Alice and Bob always face a choice between a model α
and an enveloping model β that challenges the security asserted by model α. Because both
models make identical predictions about probabilities that connect with the measured data,
Alice and Bob face a choice that no combination of logic and their fixed set of measured
results can decide. They must make a judgment, or, to put it baldly, they must make a guess
and act on it [1].
V. MODULATION OF CLOCK RATE TO IMPROVE SECURITY
While Alice and Bob may view their need for guesswork and judgment as bad news,
they can put this need to good use if their system designer Diana recognizes that Eve is in
the same boat: she too must act on guesswork. Recognizing this, Diana can design a key
distribution system with features that make it harder for Eve to snoop.
As discussed in Section III, to accord with model α, any receiver whether Bob’s or
Eve’s, must maintain close synchrony with Alice’s transmission in order to function. In both
the segmented and the probe cases discussed above, the models α and β can accord with
measured results only if Bob’s and Eve’s receivers work in accord with enveloping models
similar to model δ that expresses clock skew contained within an allowed leeway. Recall that
model δ describes a receiver as parsing its results for each of Alice’s bits into two parts, one
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indicating ‘0’, ‘1’, or ‘inconclusive’, the other indicating skew to be contained by adjusting
the faster-slower lever of Bob’s clock, and, like Bob’s receiver, Eve’s must do this to make
eavesdropping measurements at times that work.5
We suggest that Diana try to design Alice’s transmitter and Bob’s receiver to make
the parsing by Eve’s receiver impossible without use of prior information that Alice has also
encoded, and that Bob has better access to than does Eve. The idea is for Alice’s transmitter
to be timed by a clock whose rate is intentionally randomly varied rapidly and over a wide
range, and for Alice to encrypt indications of coming rate variations in her transmission to
Bob. The eavesdropping problem is different (and harder) for these rate variations than
for the key because they are more perishable. Quantum-mechanical models assert that the
operation of the faster-slower lever on Eve’s receiver cannot be corrected ex post; that is, if
she intercepts Alice’s signal and records it using a receiver clock unsynchronized to Alice’s
transmission, there is no way to reconstruct from her record what she would have received
with a synchronized clock.
VI. GENERALIZATION
Extending the proof in [1] that guesswork is necessary to the linking of quantum models
to results of instruments, we have introduced the concept of enveloping models to prove that
for any quantum-mechanical model α of key distribution there exists an enveloping model β
that agrees with α for commands dealt with by α, but encompasses other possibilities, and
leads to conclusions about security that conflict with those implied by model α. By drawing
on the quantum-mechanical separation of states and outcomes, this proof used more than
was really necessary. All that is necessary is the separation made in quantum mechanics
between what happens at an occurrence of a measure, an outcome, and what might have
5In the segmented case, Bob, unaware, synchronizes his receiver to Eve’s re-transmission, even
though he supposes he is synchronizing with Alice’s transmission.
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happened, expressed as the set of possible outcomes. This separation is found not only in
quantum mechanics, but in any statistical theory, and in particular in the usual electrical
engineering of “non-quantum” systems, based on Maxwell’s electromagnetics to which one
adjoins ideas of noise or the generation of random signals. In this non-quantum framework,
the statistical outlook alone allows one to introduce CPC’s as a medium in which to see a
divide between models and instruments within the CPC’s that manage both. Doing this,
one puts the statements of a model in the form Prα(j|bA, bE). Then Propositions 1 and 2
can be proved without resort to quantum mechanics, so again the issues considered above
arise: (a) what else might Eve measure that a model used by Alice and Bob has failed to
account for, and (b) how might clock pumping help Alice and Bob? Thus the uncloseable
possibility of enveloping any model α by another model β that expresses extra conditions of
the use of instruments is no peculiarity of using quantum rather than non-quantum models;
it is endemic to any cryptographic modeling that invokes probabilities.
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APPENDIX A: LEAKAGE CHANNEL IN CASE EVE USES A PROBE
This appendix proves for the case of Eve using a probe the analog of Proposition 1: if one
model with its inner products predicts a set of probabilities for outcomes, so does another
model having smaller inner products. (Thus, as in the segmented case, inner products
depend on a choice of model undetermined by measured data.) The proof here makes no
requirement that Alice choose among only two state vectors; she can choose from a set of
any size. Transposing to the CPC-context a model expressing Eve’s use of a probe [3], one
obtains a model α that assumes:
1. a set of Alice’s commands Aα;
2. a Hilbert space Hsig,α for Alice’s signals and a disjoint Hilbert space Hprobe,α for Eve’s
probe;
3. a function assigning Alice’s states to commands (here only Alice’s commands), |vα〉 :
Aα →Hsig,α;
4. a fixed starting state for Eve’s probe of |eα〉 ∈ Hprobe,α;
5. a set Eα of Eve’s possible commands to her measuring instruments;
6. unitary operators Uα(bE) for bE ∈ Eα acting on the product Hilbert space Hprobe,α ⊗
Hsig,α for the interaction of Eve’s probe with Alice’s signal;
7. a set OE of possible outcomes of Eve’s measurements, indexed by jE ;
8. for each of Eve’s commands bE ∈ Eα, a POVM ME,α(bE) with detection operators
ME,α(bE ; jE) that act on Hprobe,α;
9. a POVM for Bob’s receiver acting on Hsig,α, with possible outcomes indexed by jB and
detection operators MB(jB).
19
This produces a quantum mechanical model α in which
Prα(jB, jE|bA, bE)
= 〈vα(bA)|〈eα|U
†
α(bE)[MB(jB)⊗ME(bE ; jE)]Uα(bE)|eα|〉|vα(bA)〉. (A1)
Proposition 3 Given any such (probe) model α with inner products 〈vα(bA)|vα(b
′
A)〉 and
any 0 ≤ r < 1, there is a model β that gives the same conditional probabilities of Eve’s and
Bob’s outcomes for each command bE ∈ Eα and for all of Bob’s commands, so
(∀bA ∈ Aα, bE ∈ Eα)Prβ(jE |bA, bE) = Prα(jE |bA, bE) (A2)
while
(∀bA 6= b
′
A)|〈vβ(bA)|vβ(b
′
A)〉| = r|〈vα(bA)|vα(b
′
A)〉|. (A3)
Proof: The proof extends the construction used in the proof of Proposition 1, with a model
β defined by
1. the same command set for Alice: Aβ = Aα;
2. signals expressed by a vector intended by Alice, as in model α, tensored in to an
unintended vector in an additional Hilbert space Hleak, so Alice produces vectors
|vβ(bA)〉 = |wβ(bA)〉 ⊗ |vα(bA)〉, with |wβ(bA)〉 ∈ Hleak;
3. a fixed starting state for Eve’s probe of |eα〉 ∈ Hprobe,α;
4. a larger set of commands for Eve, Eβ = Eα ⊔ Eextra (disjoint union);
5. unitary operators Uβ(bE) acting on Hleak⊗Hprobe,α⊗Hsig,α for the interaction of Eve’s
probe with Alice’s signal, defined so that
Uβ(bE) =


1leak ⊗ Uα(bE) for all bE ∈ Eα,
Eve’s choice of unitary Uβ(bE) if bE ∈ Eextra;
(A4)
6. a POVM-valued function of Eve’s commands to her measuring instruments, with de-
tection operators defined so
Mβ(bE ; jE) =


1⊗Mα(bE ; jE) for all bE ∈ Eα,
Eve’s choice of POVM on
Hleak ⊗Hprobe,α if bE ∈ Eextra.
(A5)
According to model β, if Eve chooses any measurement command of Eα, Eq. (A2) holds.
But model β speaks not of the vectors |vα(bA)〉 but of other vectors having an inner product
(relevant to the security of quantum key distribution) of
|〈vβ(bA)|vβ(b
′
A)〉| = |〈w(bA)|w(b
′
A)〉||〈vα(bA)|vα(b
′
A)〉|. (A6)
The unit vectors |w(bA)〉 can be specified so that |w(bA)〉 = r
1/2|u(bA)〉 + (1 − r)|u0〉, with
〈u(bA)|u(b
′
A)〉 = 0 for all bA 6= b
′
A and 〈u(bA)|u0〉 = 0 for all bA ∈ Aβ. With this specification
Eq. (2) holds, and furthermore r can be chosen as small as one wishes. ✷
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